

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2432
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS
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USMISSION USNATO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
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USDOCOLANDSOUTHEAST IZMIR
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
CINCUSAFE
CINCUSAREUR
CINCUSNAVEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 ANKARA 4764

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PEPR, TU, UR, US
SUBJECT: ECEVIT VISIT TO MOSCOW: POLITICAL ASPECTS

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REF: MOSCOW 14782

1. SUMMARY: FROM READING THE TURKISH PRESS IT IS
HARD TO AVOID THE IMPRESSION THAT ECEVIT WON IMPORTANT
POLITICAL CONCESSIONS AT MOSCOW, PARTICULARLY ON
CYPRUS AND ON DELINEATING THE BLACK SEA CONTINENTAL
SHELF, AND THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE AGREED TO AN UNEXPECTEDLY

GENEROUS PACKAGE OF TRADE AND PROJECT ASSISTANCE PROPOSALS. HE HAS ALSO MOVED TOWARD HIS PARTY'S LEFT-WING WHILE DEMONSTRATING THAT THE RPP'S TRADITIONAL ADVOCACY OF BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE USSR CAN BRING TANGIBLE BENEFITS TO TURKEY WITHOUT DAMAGING ITS WESTERN TIES. THE SOVIETS DO NOT APPEAR TO HAVE WON ANY OF THE CONCRETE BENEFITS WHICH THEY WERE REPORTED HERE AS SEEKING IN AREAS SUCH AS ENHANCED OVERLAND TRANSIT RIGHTS, MEDITERRANEAN PORT FACILITIES, OR SIGNATURE OF A NON-AGGRESSION PACT. NONETHELESS, ECEVIT'S FULSOME PRAISE OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AS MEN OF "GOOD WILL" AND HIS STRESS ON THE "MUTUAL CONFIDENCE" UNDERLYING THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP STRIKES US AS SOMETHING OF A PROPAGANDA ACHIEVEMENT FOR THE USSR. THE SOVIETS SEEM TO HAVE MADE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INVESTMENTS IN THE HOPE OF GAINING LEVERAGE. WHILE WE DO NOT EXPECT ANY IMMEDIATE ADVERSE EFFECT ON US INTERESTS FROM THE IMPRESSION GENERATED HERE OF SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW, ECEVIT PROBABLY FEELS IN A STRONGER DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL POSITION TO RESPOND FORCEFULLY IF WE FAIL TO LIFT THE ARMS EMBARGO. ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE VISIT ARE ANALYZED IN A SEPARATE CABLE. END SUMMARY.

2. FROM ANKARA'S PERSPECTIVE, THE MOST NOTABLE POLITICAL RESULTS OF ECEVIT'S FIVE-DAY VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION --AS REFLECTED IN PUBLIC SOURCES -- APPEAR TO BE THE FOLLOWING:
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--ON CYPRUS, THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ENDORSES THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS AND ESCHEWS ANY MENTION OF "INTERNATIONALIZATION" OF THE DISPUTE -- A SIGNIFICANT SOVIET TILT TOWARD THE TURKS, UNLESS IT IS SUBSEQUENTLY MODIFIED TO MEET GREEK CYPRIOT DEMANDS.

-- THE SOVIETS AGREED TO A DELIMITATION OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF IN THE BLACK SEA WHICH THE TURKS MAINTAIN IS BASED ON THEIR OWN PROPOSALS AND CONSISTENT WITH THE TURKISH POSITION IN THE AEGEAN DISPUTE WITH GREECE (I.E., MEDIAN LINE).

--THE LONG-AWAITED "POLITICAL DOCUMENT" FELL FAR SHORT OF THE NON-AGGRESSION PACT REPORTEDLY SOUGHT BY THE USSR AND IS LARGELY, THE TURKS EMPHASIZE, A RECASTING OF THE LANGUAGE OF THE DETENTE UNDERTAKINGS IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THE FAILURE OF THE SOVIETS (THE TURKS ARE CONVINCED THEY TRIED) TO GET THE TURKS TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO A MORE NEUTRALIST COURSE WILL PROBABLY BE PORTRAYED BY ECEVIT'S SUPPORTERS AS BOTH A PERSONAL VICTORY FOR ECEVIT AND, PERHAPS, A "PROOF" THAT ECEVIT CAN STAND UP TO SOVIET POLITICAL PRESSURE.

-- THE EXPANDED TWO-YEAR CULTURAL EXCHANGE AGREEMENT, ALONG WITH AN EXPECTED LARGE INCREASE IN SOVIET PROJECT

ASSISTANCE, WILL PROBABLY RESULT IN A CONSIDERABLE
INCREASE IN THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN TURKEY OVER THE NEXT
FEW YEARS.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 ANKARA 4764

--THE REPORTED SOVIET AGREEMENT TO MEET A LARGE
PART OF TURKEY'S NEED FOR OIL (SEPTELS) OPENS A POTENTIAL
FOR POLITICAL LEVERAGE.

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3. DOMESTIC POLITICAL IMPACT: WE HAVE NOT YET HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE VISIT WITH A WIDE SPECTRUM OF TURKISH POLITICAL OBSERVERS, BUT OUR INITIAL IMPRESSION IS THAT ECEVIT HAS STRENGTHENED HIS POSITION IN HIS OWN PARTY AND PERHAPS HAS WON A LITTLE MORE CONFIDENCE WITHIN THE COUNTRY AT LARGE. HE HAS GIVEN HIS PARTY'S EVER-RESTIVE LEFT WING MORE THAN THEY PROBABLY EXPECTED. HIS PRAISE OF THE GOOD-WILL OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND STRESS ON THE "MUTUAL CONFIDENCE" UNDERLYING RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION PROVIDES GOOD AMMUNITION FOR THOSE ON THE LEFT WHO ARGUE THAT TURKEY CAN SAFELY LOOSEN ITS TIES TO THE WEST WITHOUT BEING THREATENED BY THE SOVIETS. THE LEFT WILL ALSO SEE THE PROSPECT OF GREATLY INCREASED SOVIET PROJECT ASSISTANCE AS LIKELY TO STRENGTHEN THE PUBLIC VERSUS THE PRIVATE SECTOR. WHILE PLACATING THE LEFT, ECEVIT HAS PROBABLY ALSO REDUCED HIS VULNERABILITY TO CENTER-RIGHT CRITICISM BY PROJECTING AN IMAGE OF A CAPABLE AND TOUGH NEGOTIATOR ABLE TO PURSUE TURKISH NATIONAL INTERESTS EFFECTIVELY IN BOTH WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW. IN THIS RESPECT, HIS ACHIEVEMENT IN MOSCOW WILL SEEM ALL THE MORE IMPRESSIVE IN VIEW OF THE WIDESPREAD SPECULATION HERE IN ADVANCE OF THE TRIP THAT THE SOVIETS WERE AFTER IMPORTANT CONCESSIONS, INCLUDING PORT FACILITIES ON THE MEDITERRANEAN, ENHANCED OVERLAND TRANSIT RIGHTS THROUGH TURKEY AND A NON-AGRESSION PACT. MANY OBSERVERS ALSO EXPECTED THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT OFFER MILITARY ASSISTANCE. ECEVIT CAN NOW ARGUE THAT HE WON IMPORTANT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL GAINS FROM THE SOVIETS WITHOUT BUDGING ON ANY OF THESE SENSITIVE ISSUES.

4. THE OPPOSITION HAS SO FAR REFRAINED FROM STRONG CRITICISM OF THE VISIT, BUT MAY ATTACK LATER. HOWEVER,
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THE POLICY REPRESENTED IN THE VISIT IS BASICALLY THE SAME AS THE OPPOSITION FOLLOWED WHEN IN POWER; ALSO, THE OPPOSITION MAY WANT TO AVOID CHARGES OF WEAKENING THE COUNTRY BY ATTACKING THE GOVERNMENT ON A DELICATE DIPLOMATIC ISSUE. SEVERAL MINOR PUBLICATIONS HAVE TALKED VAGUELY OF THE "PRICE" TURKEY WILL HAVE TO PAY FOR CLOSER SOVIET RELATIONS, BUT THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE CRITICISM OF ANY OF ECEVIT'S SPECIFIC ACTIONS OR STATEMENTS IN MOSCOW. FORMER FONMIN CAGLAYANGIL (USTICE PARTY), IN LUNCHEON CONVERSATION JUNE 23, TOLD US HE SAW THE TRIP AS ANOTHER "ONE MAN SHOW",

CARRIED OUT BY THE PRIMIN WITH MINIMAL STAFF ADVICE OR CONSULTATION WITH OTHER TURKISH LEADERS. (NOTE: THE ENGLISH PHRASE, "ONE MAN SHOW", IS INCREASINGLY HEARD IN TURKISH CONVERSATIONS AS A DESCRIPTION OF ECEVIT'S STYLE OF GOVERNING.) CAGLAYANGIL WENT ON TO SAY THAT "THE TIMING WAS VERY BAD AND THE CONTENTS (OF THE POLITICAL DOCUMENT) WERE VERY BAD". OBSERVING THAT IT IS ALWAYS DIFFICULT TO LIVE NEXT TO A SUPER POWER, HE EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT A MAJORITY OF TURKS WOULD SUPPORT A STRONG EFFORT TO WARM UP TURKISH-SOVIET RELATIONS, GIVEN THE FACT THAT IN 13 WARS WITH THE RUSSIANS, "EVERY TURKISH FAMILY HAS HAD A MARTYR".

5. INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS: DESPITE ECEVIT'S RHETORICAL EXTRAVAGANCE IN PRAISING HIS HOSTS, HE SEEMS TO HAVE MANAGED TO GAIN IMPORTANT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES FROM THE SOVIETS WITHOUT -- AT LEAST IN TERMS OF IMMEDIATE EFFECTS--COMPROMISING TURKEY'S POSITION WITHIN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. COMMENTATORS CLOSE TO HIM HAVE STRESSED THAT THIS VISIT "BALANCES" HIS PERFORMANCE AT THE NATO SUMMIT LAST MONTH WHEN HE RECONFIRMED TURKEY'S DESIRE TO REMAIN CLOSELY TIED TO THE WEST. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE EMBARGO, IT SEEMS TO US SURPRISING THAT THE SOVIET S WERE UNABLE TO GAIN MORE IMMEDIATE AND TANGIBLE BENEFITS. NONETHELESS, CONFIDENTIAL

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OVER THE LONG RUN THIS VISIT AND THE CLOSER ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL TIES WHICH WILL ENSUE COULD CONSIDERABLY ENHANCE THE SOVIET POSITION HERE.

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USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 ANKARA 4764

6. THE LANGUAGE ON CYPRUS IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE
HAS BEEN SEEN HERE AS A REAL DIPLOMATIC COUP FOR
TURKEY. (THE TWO SIDES CALLED FOR THE "SPEEDIEST
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POSSIBLE SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM THROUGH POSITIVE
AND CONSTRUCTIVE TALKS BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES...")
ACCORDING TO TURKISH COMMENTATORS IN MOSCOW, THIS
LANGUAGE WAS THE RESULT OF SOME VERY TOUGH BARGAINING
AND ACHIEVED ONLY AFTER ECEVIT PERSONALLY INTERVENED.
SINCE THE TURKS ARE PRESSING FOR, AND THE GREEK CYPRIOTS
RESISTING, IMMEDIATE RESUMPTION OF THE INTERCOMMUNAL
TALKS, THE LANGUAGE IN THE COMMUNIQUE SEEMS HERE TO
REPRESENT AN ENDORSEMENT OF THE TURKISH POSITION.
MOSCOW'S COMMENTS (REFTEL) NOTWITHSTANDING, THE GREEKS
SEEM TO SEE IT THIS WAY TOO. "MILLIYET" REPORTED
FROM MOSCOW ON SUNDAY THAT KYPRIANOU WAS EXPECTED IN
MOSCOW "NEXT WEEK". THE TURKS, OF COURSE, WILL WATCH
VERY CAREFULLY HOW THE SOVIETS PLAY HIS VISIT SINCE
THEY HAVE CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE WITH THE SOVIET
TENDENCY TO TALK OUT OF BOTH SIDES OF THEIR MOUTH ON
THIS ISSUE.

7. THE TURKS ARE POINTING TO THEIR AGREEMENT WITH

THE SOVIETS, AFTER ONE WEEK OF NEGOTIATIONS, OVER
DEMARCATON OF THE BLACK SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF AS AN
OBJECT LESSON IN HOW SWIFTLY NEGOTIATIONS OF THIS SORT
CAN BE CONCLUDED IF THERE IS GOOD WILL ON BOTH SIDES.
IN THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS THEY HAVE AVOIDED DIRECTLY
DRAWING THE PARALLEL IN REGARD TO THE AEGEAN, BUT
OBVIOUSLY THE TURKS WILL WANT TO PRESENT THE BLACK SEA
AGREEMENT AS A PRECEDENT THEY CAN USE WITH THE GREEKS.
THEY MAINTAIN THAT THE AGREEMENT IS BASED LARGELY
ON THE TURKISH POSITION, PRESUMABLY THE SAME "MEDIAN
LINE" POSITION WHICH TURKEY HAS ADVANCED IN THE AEGEAN.
(COMMENT: WE DO NOT CONSIDER THAT THE BLACK SEA AND
AEGEAN ISSUES ARE IN ANY MIMPORANT RESPECT COMPARABLE.
END COMMENT.)
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8. IN SUM, THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO HAVE MADE SOME VERY
IMPORTANT SHORT AND MEDIUM TERM POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
INVESTMENTS IN THEIR TURKISH RELATIONSHIP IN THE HOPES
OF A SUBSTANTIAL LONG-TERM PAYOFF. THE EXTENT
TO WHICH THEIR INVESTMENTS YIELD REAL POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC LEVERAGE IN TURKEY WILL DEPEND PARTLY ON THE
SKILL OF THIS AND FUTURE TURKISH GOVERNMENTS IN
MANAGING THE SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. IT WILL ALSO DEPEND
ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE WEST IS READY AND WILLING
TO BE RESPONSIVE TO TURKISH NEEDS IN THE MILITARY
AND ECONOMIC FIELDS, AND THIS WILL CERTAINLY BE THE
FOCUS OF TURKISH ATTENTION. TURKS OF ALL POLITICAL
PERSUASIONS ARE LIKELY TO SEE THE EVENTS OF LAST WEEK
IN TERMS OF A SOVIET CHALLENGE TO THE WEST FOR POLITICAL
INFLUENCE HERE. WHATEVER THE REALITY, THE LOCAL PERCEPTION
OF AN INCREASINGLY CREDIBLE SOVIET ALTERNATIVE TO
TURKEY'S TRADITIONAL WESTERN TIES COULD MAKE THE
TURKS MORE DEMANDING AND TOUGHER TO DEAL WITH REGARDLESS
OF THE OUTCOME OF THE EMBARGO STRUGGLE. IT MAY ALSO MAKE
TURKS FEEL THAT THEY CAN RESPOND MORE STRONGLY IN
CUTTING BACK THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH US IF
THE EFFORT TO LIFT THE EMBARGO FAILS.
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